The current paper explores the possibilities of an improvement of the interaction of an ACT-R actor with its environment including other actors. This is done in the framework of a project aiming at a multi-actor simulation environment based on the ACT-R architecture. Two objections against traditional cognitive architectures like Soar and ACT-R, namely the lack of physical grounding and the lack of symbol grounding, are explained. For a possible improvement of this situation, organizational semiotics and simulation of emotion seem to offer promising perspectives. Organizational semiotics offers us concepts for the encoding of the environment in the form of affordance signs, social constructs and social norms. This leads to new declarative chunk types in ACT-R. An emotion subsystem can maintain an emotional state that encourages task performance, learning, and social behaviour. An awareness subsystem enables task switching based on the emotional state and the selection of those social constructs and norms that are applicable to the current situation.
Introduction
We aim at the development of a multi-actor simulation environment based on ACT-R that can be used for experimentation with concepts from organizational semiotics and organization theory [1] [2] [3] [4] . However, at the beginning of our project, ACT-R did know only a singleactor implementation that could not be used for multi-actor simulations. Our first task, therefore, has been to make ACT-R suitable for multi-actor simulation.
Thus far, we have succeeded in rebuilding ACT-R as a Java program, and have realized several enhancements that enable actors to interact in a multi-actor environment [1] [2] [3] [4] . The single-actor ACT-R program has been replaced by a client-server system in which each actor is a client running on some machine, and the simulated physical environment is the server running one some (maybe other) machine. The communication between actors (and environment) is based on TCP/IP sockets, the FIPA protocol and XML messages. The ACT-R memory organization has been made more flexible in order to enable new memory access structures (buffers) that are necessary for handling interactive behaviour like movement, perception, communication and social behaviour. A module for perception and movement in two-dimensional space has been added, as well as a module for the sending and interpretation of (XML) messages. For running experiments, a module for the collection of data and storing these in an external database has been realized. The user interface enables running simulations, and inspecting the contents of each actor's memory contents in terms of declarative chunks and productions (and their activations). Experiments with actor interaction while moving in a two-dimensional world have been done, showing the formation of (tacit) social constructs [4] .
The current paper explores the possibilities of setting a further step ahead in the direction of an improvement of the interaction of the ACT-R actor with the environment and with other actors. For possible improvements we have turned to two areas: organizational semiotics and simulation of emotion. Organizational semiotics offers us a concept for the encoding of signals from the environment and the actor body in the form of affordances, and gives us the concepts of social construct and social norm as regulators of socially acceptable behaviour. Simulations of emotion gives us the emotional state that, when monitored, could be used for flexible switching between goals and for the encouragement of social behaviour.
2 The use of ACT-R in a multi-actor simulation
ACT-R and Soar as cognitive architectures
Actors in a multi-actor simulation can display intelligent behaviour if they are based on cognitive architectures like Soar [6] or ACT-R [7] [8] [9] . Soar and ACT-R provide the best simulation models of human intelligence known thus far with respect to higher cognitive functions like language use and solving problems.
Soar and ACT-R both are goal-oriented production systems. A production system consists of a set of production rules (or, for short, productions), and a set of data structures representing the state of the system [5] . Each production consists of a production side and an action side. In goal-oriented systems, the existence of a goal of a certain type is part of the condition side. The production system works by selecting the productions that match with the current goal and data structures, and firing the selected productions. Firing means executing the action side of a production; this results in a change of goal structures and data structures. Based on the changed goal structures and data structures, a new set of productions is selected and fired. This goes on until no production can be selected, for instance because the goal collection is empty.
Soar and ACT-R differ in a number of ways 1 . ACT-R has a long-term declarative memory separated form the long-term procedural memory. In the declarative memory, there are declarative chunks, while in the production memory there are productions. Declarative memory is very flexible, while proceduralized knowledge has abandoned flexibility on favour of efficiency in access 2 . Soar does not have a long-term declarative memory, which means that Soar can only learn declarative facts by a very complicated mechanism called data chunking.
In some production systems, it is possible to match many production rules and fire these in parallel. This means that an unbounded amount of computation could be done in one production cycle. In a simulation of human cognition, this is not very plausible. Therefore, ACT-R allows parallelism in the matching of productions to the current goal, but only allows the production with the highest expected utility to fire. Although Soar allows for the matching and firing of many productions in parallel, this is only done for collecting information needed to select the operator to be applied. After that, only one operator is selected which is more or less equivalent to allowing only one production to fire and change the goal state and other data structures. A major difference between Soar and ACT-R is that Soar places conflict resolution (the selection of the goal to fire) at the symbolic level, while ACT-R handles this at the subsymbolic level.
In Soar, there is no activation of declarative chunks and productions. In ACT-R, there is a continuously varying activation of declarative chunks and productions. The activation calculation apparatus is subsymbolic (neural network like), and uses 35 variables and parameters 3 . The activation of declarative chunks is based on its past usefulness, relevance to the general context, relevance to the specific match required, and some added noise to avoid getting stuck in local minima [9] . The past usefulness of a declarative chunk diminishes with time, and increases each time it is used. The activation of productions is (e) expected gain or expected utility. It depends on (q) the probability of the production working successfully, (r) the probability of achieving the goal if the production works successfully, (g) the value of the goal, (a) the cost in time that the production will take, and (b) the amount of time it will take to reach the goal after the production has completed 4 . e = q * r * g -(a + b)
In Soar, subgoals are created automatically when an impasse occurs. Such an impasse occurs when a decision about what operator to apply cannot be made. In ACT-R, the creation of subgoals has to be specified explicitly in the action side of a production.
Soar has only one mechanism for learning, called chunking. Chunking is a symbolic mechanism for learning production rules. The chunking mechanism makes a new production based on the successful resolution of an impasse. "Whenever problem solving has provided some result, a new production will be created, whose actions are these just-obtained results and whose conditions are the working-memory elements that existed before the problem solving started that were used to produce the results."
5 ACT-r uses a similar mechanism for symbolic learning of productions called production compilation. This mechanism, however, is still a topic of discussion, and thus far not very well specified in the available scientific literature. The problem is that the symbolic learning of productions using Soar's chunking and of earlier versions of production compilation tended to produce too many productions. The efforts of the ACT-R group directed at limiting this proliferation of new productions are still going on. Act-R has two other mechanisms for symbolic learning, both resulting in the creation of new declarative chunks. Declarative chunks can be encoded based on perception data. These encoded perception data become a repository of concrete knowledge. The popping of a goal results in the storage of the completed goal as a declarative chunk. These popped goals become a repository of abstract knowledge 6 . In addition to symbolic learning, ACT-R has subsymbolic learning mechanisms. Without use, the activation of declarative chunks and productions diminishes gradually; they more or less fade away until they reach a level at which they no longer can be retrieved. This 'forgetting' of memory elements is impossible in Soar. Base on their successful use, the activation of declarative chunks and production rules is enhanced (partially determined by a Boltzmann factor).
In recent versions of ACT-R (4.0 and 5.0), several modifications have been made. These modifications fit in a drive to make ACT-R more fine-grained, matching experimental data. One of the modifications is to limit the unrealistically powerful computations of the ACT-R architecture [8] [9] , for instance following from the complexity of production rules that led to complex interdependent retrieval with backtracking. Other restrictions have been made to the action side of productions. Furthermore, modifications have been made to the mechanism of symbolic learning of productions. In ACT-R 5.0, the architecture has changed by distinguishing the long-term declarative and production memory modules from several shortterm memory buffers. Examples of these buffers are the goal buffer, the visual buffer, and the motor buffer [9] .
Because of the distinction between declarative and procedural memory, the availability of perception and action buffers and of subsymbolic learning ACT-R seems to be more suitable as a basis for modelling actors than Soar. 4 However, ACT-R has several shortcomings as far as interaction with the environment and the handling of social behaviour are concerned.
Problems of traditional cognitive architectures with interaction with the environment
There is a long history of criticism because on traditional cognitive architectures like Soar and ACT-R because they do not place the interaction of the actor with the environment (including other actors) central. There are two lines of criticism: the lack of physical grounding, and the lack of symbol grounding [10] .
According to Simon, in his famous 'ant in the sand' parable 7 , "Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, are quite simple. The apparent complexity of our behaviour over time is largely a reflection of the complexity of the environment in which we find ourselves." According to Brooks [12] , it is better to construct such an 'ant in the sand' deriving its intelligence from the interaction with the environment first, in order to understand human cognition. Brooks criticizes the lack of physical grounding of traditional artificial intelligence [13] [14] . He wants to base a new approach in artificial intelligence on the physical grounding hypothesis. "This hypothesis states that to build a system that is intelligent it is necessary to have its representations grounded in the physical world. Our experience with this approach is that once this commitment is made, the need for traditional symbolic representations soon fades entirely. The key observation is that the world is its own best model. It is always exactly up to date. It always contains every detail there is to be known. The trick is to sense it appropriately and often enough." [13] Brooks furthermore states [14] : "We hypothesize that much of even human level activity is similarly a reflection of the world through very simple mechanisms without detailed representation". Using Von Uexküll's [15] semiotic Umwelt concept, Brooks argues that cognition does not necessarily need internal representations of the outside world, but can use the semiotic Umwelt instead [13] . Based on this point of view, Brooks and his collaborators have developed an alternative approach to embodied cognitive agents focusing on "developmental organization, social interaction, embodiment and physical coupling, and multimodal integration" [16] . Important points of view are, furthermore, that humans have no full monolithic internal models, and that humans have no monolithic control. Based in this approach, the famous Cog robot has been constructed that displays complex behaviour. The embodied cognitive agents approach also finds inspiration in the work of Gibson [17] , and therefore has common roots with the Stamper school of organizational semiotics [18] A second line of criticism on cognitive architectures like Soar and ACT-R focuses on the lack of symbol grounding. "Symbol manipulation should be about something and the symbols should acquire their meaning from reality" [10] . Searle argues in his famous 'Chinese Room Argument' [24] that it is difficult to see how you can understand something about the world based on symbol manipulation alone. Symbols that only refer to other symbols have no connection to the reality outside the world of symbols. Harnad [25] defines the symbol grounding problem as follows: "How can you ever get off the symbol/symbol merry-goround? How is symbol meaning to be grounded in something other than just more meaningless symbols?" Vogt [10] recommends the use of the Peircean triad as a means to analyze and overcome the symbol grounding problem. This means that each sign should have its object and its interpretant. The link between object, sign and interpretant should be learned by the actor.
We can now understand why the ACT-R actor is not very strong in reacting on events that happen in its environment. There are two simple learning mechanisms with respect to interaction with the environment and other actors: encoding the environment in declarative chunks and changing the activation of the encoded declarative chunks based on their use. More complex learning mechanisms like the learning of affordances (linking the recognition 7 Simon, 1998, p.53 [11] . of an object with the possible behaviour patterns stored in the interpretant) and Peircean triads (linking object, sign, and interpretant) are still missing.
An important role in a multi-actor simulation is played by the real or simulated physical environment, especially if we want to base the actor's intelligence more on its interaction with the environment. However, building a simulated active environment that enables the simulated actor to learn is a relatively unexplored terrain. Examples are Epstein and Axtell's Sugarscape world 8 [26] and the NEW TIES project [27] .
Problems of ACT-R with social behaviour
A problem of the use of ACT-R is its focus on behaviour in Newell's the cognitive band and lower rational band (10 -1 -10 2 sec) 9 . The basic time unit of operation of ACT-R is 50 milliseconds (which is the default time for a production action 10 ), while the time scale of social behaviour lies in Newell's upper rational band and social band at 10 3 -10 7 sec (17 min -12 days). The overall move of ACT-R in its versions 4.0 and 5.0 is towards modelling cognition at a finer grain size, which makes the problem to bridge the distance between 50 milliseconds and the time scale of social behaviour even harder.
The atomic components of ACT-R are relatively simple declarative chunks, goals and productions, and there is not yet much knowledge about how to handle larger (molecular) structures like social constructs and social norms. Furthermore, the ACT-R actor is not very strong in handling multiple goals. Reasoning about survival, costs, bodily harm, and so on is missing.
Experiments with ACT-R generally are based on hand-coded specifications of behaviour; the runs of this code are compared with behaviour of persons that are the subject of experimental tests. Experiments are not based on the development of emergent behaviour through interaction, and that is what we are interested in.
Potential solutions offered by organizational semiotics and simulation of emotion
Looking for possible solutions for these shortcomings we turn to two areas: organizational semiotics and simulation of emotion.
Solutions offered by organizational semiotics
Organizational semiotics [18] [23] offers interesting concepts in the field of the interaction of actors with their physical and social environment in the form of affordances, social constructs and norms. One could say that the dependence of a human being on his or her physical and social environment is emphasized and analyzed. The semiotic Umwelt and the information field offer concepts for segmentation of the environment in species-dependent and community-dependent sections. The language action perspective offers the concept of language-action based interaction protocols with roles for the participating actors. Dynamic semiotics offers tools for analyzing the structures of actions, related actors and objects, and their encoding in messages.
If we look at the basic possibilities of the ACT-R based simulated actor to learn from its environment (encoding and change in activation of encoded chunks based on their use), it seems that we have to look for ways to encode the environment in terms of concepts like affordances, norms, social communities, interaction scripts, and messages. The learning of affordances seems to be a basic step that can be followed by the learning of the more complex structures mentioned.
As explained earlier [28] , the affordance mechanism is a basic mechanism for coupling the recognition of an object or situation with a possible or advisable behaviour pattern. An affordance is a set of properties of the environment that makes possible or inhibits activity [17] . According to Gibson 11 , "The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. . . . The medium, substances, surfaces, objects, places, and other animals have affordances for a given animal. They offer benefit or injury, life or death. This is why they need to be perceived".
Objects are discriminated because of what they afford, not as belonging to a fixed class of objects defined by its common features. The same object may correspond to several affordances. For instance, a stone may be a missile, a paperweight, a hammer or a pendulum bob 12 . According to Stamper [19] , animals and humans develop repertoires of behaviour tuned to affordances in order to survive. If information is available in ambient light for perceiving them, affordances will be perceived. This means that affordances, being Gestalts, will be perceived rather than raw sense data . . . This means that perception ". . . has to be a process of construction. 13 " From a semiotic point of view, one could say that the perception of affordances is a process of construction of signs in the animal (or human) mind. This fits well in the view that all artefacts and sign structures have to be constructed within boundaries of reasonable computational costs [29] . These signs can be seen as semi-indexical sign structures [28] . A semi-indexical sign structure results from a process where raw data resulting from the interaction between actor and environment are unconsciously filtered, transformed, and matched to patterns [30] [31] .
This process leads to a Peircean triad consisting of sign, object and interpretant. The semiindexical sign structure (sign) representing an affordance is caused by an object or pattern in the environment, for instance a situation (object). The semi-indexical sign structure is connected to its interpretant in the human or animal mind. An interpretant can be a feeling, or an effort to act, or a goal-oriented repertoire of behaviour that Peirce would call a habit of action 14 . A habit of action is a commitment to act and a connected action program that governs the actual acting. Habits of action are mostly unconscious 15 , and can be seen as semiindexical sign structure as well. A unit consisting of a semi-indexical representation of an affordance and its associated habit of action can be seen as a unit of tacit knowledge. Because affordances are specific for an animal species, tacit knowledge will be specific for an animal species as well.
Solutions offered by simulation of emotion
For a flexible handling of events that happen in its environment, the simulation of emotion seems crucial. Breazeal [34] [35] has designed a robot that is motivated by emotional drives. These drives correspond to a need to interact with people (the social drive), to be stimulated (the stimulation drive) and to occasionally rest (the fatigue drive). The emotion system of the robot is inspired by theories of basic emotions of humans. The emotional system adds affective information to incoming perceptual, behavioural, and motivational information, maintains an affective state, and subsequently determines an emotive response.
If the actor has a basic mechanism that generates emotional signals based on what happens in the actor's body and in the actor's environment, these signals can be used for an evaluation of the current goal structure and the associated actions. A switching of goals can be the result, enabling the actor to react on events in the environment and in its body. This also opens a possibility for an evaluation of possible actions based on social norms, when one of the drives of the actor is a social drive.
How to improve the ACT-R actor
We aim at an improvement of the interaction of the ACT-R actor with the environment and with other actors. To do this, we will begin with encoding of signals from the environment (including other actors) and the actor's own body as affordances. More complex sign structures like norms and social constructs can follow from the elaboration of the basic affordances. We will also develop an emotion subsystem that encodes body signals, adds affective tags to incoming information, maintains an emotional state, and generates a trigger to switch goals whenever the emotional state becomes unacceptable. We will also develop an active environment in which objects broadcast their characteristics to actors, and react on actor actions.
With respect to other aspects of the simulation, we have to limit ourselves to simple solutions. We will abstract from the problem of processing feature patterns perceived by the actor into Gestalts, and will assume that objects broadcast their characteristics in a way that enables the actor to classify them and develop its classification system. Furthermore, we have to restrict the unlimited possibilities of language. Language processing is not the primary subject of our simulation. At the moment we use (a) the FIPA-ACL 16 language actions, and (b) XML formats for declarative chunks (encoding information about the task environment), productions, time synchronization, messages about position and perception. We want to enrich this with more XML formats enabling messages about situations, norms, and social constructs.
Encoding the environment and body signals

The environment
The environment of the actor has to be an active environment in order to let the actor learn from its interaction with the environment. The objects and actors broadcast their characteristics, a broadcast that can be received by the actor when it is in perception range. The objects and actors in the environment also have to react on the actions of the actor in order to generate a feedback effect. One of the tasks of the environment, including the objects in the environment, is to enforce the (simulated) laws of nature. One of the possibilities to do that is to make the objects based on a finite state machine. Furthermore, the environment has to take care of time synchronization. Time synchronization has a technical aspect that has to do with the distribution of agents and environments over many computers. Not all computers have the same speed. This technical aspect of synchronization is best handled by a central time synchronizer on the central server of the simulation. The aspect of synchronization that has to do with the different time scales of thinking by the actors, the physical activities of actors, and the social activities of actors is best handled by a secondary time synchronizer attached to the environment.
When it comes to encoding the environment, we can look at (a) the perceived affordances(section 4.2), (b) the actions that are possible by the actor in relation to these affordances (section 4.3), (c) the perceived actions of other actors (section 4.4), (d) the perceived documents and messages (section 4.5), emotions (section 4.6), and the chunk types needed for encoding all this in ACT-R (section 4.7).
Affordances
Recall (see section 3.1) that the encoding of an affordance has to lead to a Peircean triad consisting of sign, object and interpretant. The terrains, objects, plants, animals, and actors and other Peircean objects in the environment send signals about their characteristics to the actor. The actor can perceive these signals if it is in perception range of the sender. The signals sent by the object are encoded as a sign in the actor's mind, namely an ACT-R declarative chunk. To do this effectively, the actor has to invent a name for the object that acts as access point to the sign to be created. The sign in the actor's mind is connected to the interpretant, which is a collection of possible actions towards the object. The result of this encoding process is an affordance sign consisting of (a) the name of the object, (b) the class of the object, (c) individual attributes of the object, (d) place/ time attributes of the object, and (e) possible actions towards the object.
There is a problem, however, when an affordance does not correspond to an object allowing one or several actions by the actor. In the ideal situation, an object (a) only allows one type of action by the actor (b), and they can be encoded together as a simple affordance. Most objects (a), however, afford many types of actions (b) (for instance, food can be picked up, eaten, and given to another actor). Some types of action by the actor (b) are related to several objects (a) (for instance, moving in a terrain with your own body towards another actor). This complicates the encoding of affordance signs as packages of recognized objects and their associated action possibilities. The most straightforward solution to this problem is to distinguish between affordances bound to the recognition of an object (with one or many actions enabled) and situation-affordances that are bound to the recognition of a situation (with one action or action script enabled; we want to avoid situations with many objects and many actions as elements that are encoded as much as possible). A similar solution has been reached in logic, where situations have been recognized as first-class objects [36] [37] . The recognition of situation-affordances also opens up the possibility to use case theory for analysis of (amongst others) the roles played by actors and objects in a situation.
Actions enabled by affordances
The actor needs at least a basic knowledge of physical affordances. Basic physical affordance classes in a simple simulated world are, for instance, terrain, object, food, plant, animal, actor, and document [27] . The actor has a limited set of possible actions associated with each affordance class. An example table for a simple environment is given below (Table 1) . The actions to be taken by the actor are dependent on the social community and social situation recognized by the actor; this is elaborated below (section 4.4).
Table1. Affordance Classes
Based on experimentation and experience, the actor should be able to create more complex action patterns. In a similar way, the actor should be able to develop affordance subclasses. This requires the stimulation of playful behaviour including evaluation moments by the emotion subsystem, and a correct functioning of the production compilation in ACT-R.
The actions of other actors
Organizational semiotics requires the recognition of the current social context in order to be able to determine the advisable behaviour in a certain situation. The current social context consists of a combination of the current social community, the type of social situation, own role or task in the current situation, and the phase of that situation related to a ritual, protocol, or script.
It is assumed that the actor determines the current social context based on the characteristics and actions of the other actors present, and -if no other actors are presentbased on its awareness of its own social context. The social community can be given a name and is then encoded as an affordance sign of the type 'social construct'. The same holds for the type of situation, the actor roles, the script, and the phase of the script. What is a script? A script consists of phases that are linked to each other. For each phase, actor roles are distinguished. For each role in a certain phase, norms apply. A script generally is only applicable in a specific type of social situation that occurs in a specific social community.
Social constructs and norms are not encoded directly based on perception. They result out of an elaboration of newly perceived affordances related to other actors. An actor may observe that there is a usual way of doing expressible as a script in a certain situation. For instance, actor with role X does action a, then actor with role Y does b, and so on. For different situations and different communities, different scripts are applicable. Based on an evaluation of these observations, the actor may assign a name to a situation type, assign this situation type the status of a social construct and encode the usual way of doing attached to it as a script. In other words, the elaboration of observations related to other actors consists of reviewing these observations, identifying and naming situation types, and attaching statuses and associated scripts to these situation types. Scripts can be split in phases. Norms can be encoded for each combination of phase and actor role in which the actions to be taken or avoided are specified. Norms are encoded based on the format described by Liu et. al. [18] [38] , in a way that in the action part of the norm there is only one deontic operator and only one action. If an actor deduces that some other actors are part of a certain social community, and this community has been given a name (possibly by himself) the community receives the status of a social affordance.
Documents and messages
Documents are sign structures that have a more or less autonomous existence, for instance a book, a letter, an email message. Documents are also physical affordances because they allow actions like picking up, giving, writing, and reading. Documents have to be decoded (read and understood) by the actor before they can be encoded as ACT-R chunks.
At the moment the actors (as well as the environment) use FIPA-ACL language actions, and some simple XML message formats for encoding content. In order to enable messages about situations, norms, and social constructs we will enrich the XML message format library with formats based on a set of cases or roles taken from case theory 17 , and on a limited English vocabulary reflecting the simple world we try to model (something like described in [27] ). For each task environment, a suitable vocabulary will have to be created.
Emotions
The emotion subsystem encodes body signals, maintains an emotional state, monitors relevant incoming information, encodes emotional signals as emotion affordance signs, which enables the triggering of goal switching whenever the emotional state becomes unacceptable. For the purpose of the simulation, we follow Breazeal [34] [35] in choosing the drives social, stimulation, and fatigue. We add safety (i.e., avoid collisions). There is a subsumption hierarchy [12] of these drives, in which the most basic drive has the highest priority. The most basic drive is safety (safe versus fearful), then follow (in that order) fatigue (energetic versus tired), social (content versus unhappy), and stimulation (excited versus bored). The actor has at least a basic knowledge of desired actions in relation to these drives (for instance, like depicted in Table 2 ); based on experience this knowledge may develop in a more specific direction. The actor's body generates signals about several bodily functions. These signals are encoded as affordance signs. The emotion subsystem maintains an emotional state and changes this emotional state based on a monitoring of relevant incoming information about performed actions and possible threats. The emotion subsystem reports the emotional state by sending signals consisting of a set of (three) emotional affordance signs, each consisting of (a) name, (b) drive, (c) strength of the drive indicator, (d) time, and (e) desired actions. Whenever the emotional state becomes unacceptable, a trigger is generated to switch goals.
Chunk types
The encoding (including elaboration) leads to the following chunk types to be implemented in ACT-R declarative memory:
1. Affordance (sign) 
Awareness
The subsystem that implements the actor's awareness of its environment and its emotional state consists of an awareness buffer and an awareness handler. The awareness buffer contains information about the current situation in terms of the current social context and the current emotional state. The awareness buffer is necessary to select the social affordances and norms that are used for the determination of an actor's behaviour. The awareness handler has the task to trigger the elaboration the new affordance information in the perceptual buffer and the subsequent integration of the elaboration results in declarative memory, to update the awareness buffer, and to generate a trigger to change goals if that is necessary. As soon as one of the emotional state indicators sinks below the acceptable level, the awareness handler generates a trigger to determine what goal has to get focus. The actor system has a basic loop, in which (1) the body and the environment of the actor put new information encoded as affordance signs in the perceptual buffer, (2) the emotion subsystem encodes the emotional state, (3) the awareness handler gets a chance to update the awareness and eventually trigger a goal change, and (4) the goal handler gets a turn to select and fire productions 18 .
Goal switching based on emotion
The overall goal of the ACT-R actor could be a combination of:
− Change the emotional state to an acceptable level. − If the emotional state is acceptable, look for further improvement of it. − Search for an action sequence that leads to the desired emotional state in an acceptable time.
− If the emotional state is perfect, rest a while or explore a while. If a trigger is generated because the emotional state has become unacceptable, the goal stack is emptied until this overall goal gets focus again. The popped goals are remembered in declarative memory. They will be activated again as soon as changes in the emotional state make them urgent.
The use of social constructs and norms
In the declarative memory, a collection of chunks representing possible actions and their direct effects on the emotional state is maintained (this could, for instance, be a representation in chunks of Table 2 ). In the awareness buffer, the current context is maintained. Using the current context, the social constructs and associated norms that are applicable in the current context can be determined.
If an applicable norm discourages (as forbidden) a certain action, application of that action would lead the emotion subsystem to change the emotional state with respect to the social drive in a negative direction. Much in the same way, actions that are encouraged by the applicable norms will change the emotional state in a positive direction. A production that captures this knowledge could read something like: "If your goal is to maintain or improve pour emotional state, then avoid actions that predictably lead to a deterioration of the emotional state, and perform actions that predictably lead to an improvement of the emotional state". More specific productions regarding the effects of actions on the emotional state must be learned by the actor based on trial and error.
Emotional stimulation of task performance, learning and social behaviour
The stimulation drive encourages doing tasks, trying out actions (by exploration and imitation), evaluation, and subsequent learning. The social drive encourages social behaviour by an emotional premium on behaviour according to norms.
Learning
Learning in the ACT-R architecture results from the use of the encodings discussed above. In a multi-actor system, an ACT-R actor could learn based on: 1. exploration: encoding environment signals and signals from the body system, trying out actions and action patterns; 2. evaluation: identifying of, and generating names for, successful action patterns and subclasses of affordances; 3. imitation: encoding patterns of interaction (including communication) between actors as scripts with roles and imitation of these patterns in the appropriate situations; 4. knowledge transfer: decoding and encoding messages and documents; 5. social conflict resolution: storing solutions to social conflicts as social constructs [41] .
Conclusion
The architecture of human cognition ACT-R can be enhanced by the encoding of the affordances, social constructs and norms that the environment offers. Another possible improvement in ACT-R is goal switching based on emotions and awareness of the current situation. An emotion subsystem can encourage task performance, learning, and social behaviour. In this way, a bridge could be built between mainstream science emphasizing the inner workings of the cognitive system, and organizational semiotics that emphasizing the dependence of an actor on the physical and social environment.
The investigation into the use of concepts from organizational semiotics makes clear that the usefulness of concepts like affordance, norm, situation, and script can be improved if they are redefined in a more precise way using knowledge about the functioning of the human cognitive system.
